Our chapter on federalism includes an extensive discussion of crime.
Vice President JD Vance’s claim Thursday that an Immigration and Customs Enforcement officer who fatally shot Renee Nicole Good in Minneapolis is “protected by absolute immunity” drew immediate pushback from experts who said the legal landscape around a potential prosecution is far more complicated.
Speaking at the White House, Vance appeared to try to stymie any efforts by Minnesota prosecutors to pursue a criminal case against the agent.
“The precedent here is very simple. You have a federal law enforcement official engaging in federal law enforcement action – that’s a federal issue. That guy is protected by absolute immunity. He was doing his job,” Vance said, echoing others in the Trump administration. “I’ve never seen anything like that. It would get tossed out by a judge.”
That assessment was quickly met with skepticism by experts who said the vice president was overstating the law around immunity for federal officials. Vance’s comments come amid nationwide protests of ICE officials and criticism of the agency’s efforts to carry out a historic deportation campaign with little to no oversight.
As a baseline, federal officials are not immune from prosecution for state crimes just because they committed the offense while on the job. Some state prosecutions of federal officials that have gone ahead include a manslaughter charge against a postal worker who hit and killed someone while delivering mail, murder charges against military members who shot and killed a man they believed was stealing copper fixtures, and murder charges against federal officers who killed a passenger when shooting their guns at a departing car they alleged was illegally transporting whiskey.
The Supreme Court has long emphasized that “[a]n employee of the United States does not secure a general immunity from state law while acting in the course of his employment.” So when a federal officer—be it an ICE agent or a postal worker—violates a state criminal law, they can potentially face prosecution. This could include charges for trespass, breaking and entering, kidnapping, assault, manslaughter, murder, or a host of other state-law crimes.
What happens next is where things get complicated. Generally, federal officers will seek to move their case into federal court. They will claim that they are immune from prosecution under the Supremacy Clause, and a federal court will decide whether the state’s prosecution can proceed. If it does proceed, it will typically play out in federal—not state—court, though state or local officials will still prosecute the case. And if the trial ultimately leads to a conviction, that conviction will be for a state—not federal—crime. This is an important point in state-federal conflicts because the president’s pardon power extends only to federal crimes, not state crimes. (For a more thorough analysis of the procedural elements, see this Lawfare article.)
Breaking down the immunity piece, federal officials prosecuted for state crimes generally claim that they are immune from prosecution under the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause. The Supremacy Clause provides that federal law is “the supreme Law of the Land” and overrides state law when the two conflict. Courts have interpreted this provision to preclude state prosecutions when federal officials are reasonably carrying out lawful federal duties. For example, in the foundational case on Supremacy Clause immunity from 1890, the Supreme Court concluded that California could not prosecute a U.S. Marshal for murder where the marshal, who was assigned to protect a U.S. Supreme Court justice, shot and killed an attacker. In other examples, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in 2006 affirmed dismissal of a Wyoming trespassing prosecution against federal wildlife officers who accidentally entered private land while collaring wolves, and a federal district court in the 1960s ordered the dismissal of disorderly conduct charges against a U.S. Marshal for his actions quelling a segregationist riot at the University of Mississippi.
The theory behind Supremacy Clause immunity, as explained in the 2006 Tenth Circuit wolf-collaring opinion authored by then-Judge Michael McConnell, is that, “while state criminal law provides an important check against abuse of power by federal officials, the supremacy of federal law precludes the use of state prosecutorial power to frustrate the legitimate and reasonable exercise of federal authority.”
To strike this balance, federal courts have adopted a two-part test for Supremacy Clause immunity: The federal official’s actions must have been (a) authorized by federal law and (b) “necessary and proper” in fulfilling the official’s federal duties. In other words, if an officer’s actions are unauthorized, unlawful, unnecessary, or improper, the state prosecution poses no Supremacy Clause problem because it is not undermining the implementation of federal law.
In practice, the contours of this two-part test are often contested. The U.S. Supreme Court has not weighed in on Supremacy Clause immunity in more than 100 years, so the doctrine has been developed largely in lower federal courts.
