Lobbying on Iran and Venezuela

Many posts have discussed lobbying, "shadow lobbying," "unlobbying," and "non-lobbying lobbying."

Daniel Barnes at POLITICO:

LOBBYING ON THE FRONT LINES: The Trump administration’s military actions in Iran and Venezuela sparked lobbying activity from 54 companies and organizations in the first quarter of 2026, collectively spending $13.3 million, an analysis of lobbying disclosure data by our colleagues Paroma Soni and Catherine Allen found. Most of these came from political advocacy-focused groups or the energy industry.

— The biggest private sector represented was, unsurprisingly, oil and gas. Chevron spent $1.6 million on all lobbying activity in Q1 and listed sanctions on Venezuela and energy access as specific lobbying issues. Shell, which spent $1.4 million, lobbied to advance its role in the commercial development of natural gas in one of Venezuela’s largest offshore gas fields. BP lobbied on the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, which handles sanctions for Venezuelan energy activity and Iran-linked projects such as the Shah Deniz gas corridor.
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— Several advocacy groups also lobbied on pending legislation related to Iran and Venezuela, particularly on the congressional war powers resolutions to disapprove of military action. They ranged from the American Civil Liberties Union to the Quaker-aligned Friends Committee on National Legislation to the American Federation of Teachers. The pro-Israel group American Israel Public Affairs Committee lobbied on increased sanctions against Iran and U.S. military assistance to Israel, as did the “pro-Israel, pro-peace” J Street group.

Perfidy

Many posts have discussed foreign policy, war powers and the US military.

 Charlie Savage et al. at NYT:

The Pentagon used a secret aircraft painted to look like a civilian plane in its first attack on a boat that the Trump administration said was smuggling drugs, killing 11 people last September, according to officials briefed on the matter. The aircraft also carried its munitions inside the fuselage, rather than visibly under its wings, they said.

The nonmilitary appearance is significant, according to legal specialists, because the administration has argued its lethal boat attacks are lawful — not murders — because President Trump “determined” the United States is in an armed conflict with drug cartels.

But the laws of armed conflict prohibit combatants from feigning civilian status to fool adversaries into dropping their guard, then attacking and killing them. That is a war crime called “perfidy.”

Retired Maj. Gen. Steven J. Lepper, a former deputy judge advocate general for the United States Air Force, said that if the aircraft had been painted in a way that disguised its military nature and got close enough for the people on the boat to see it — tricking them into failing to realize they should take evasive action or surrender to survive — that was a war crime under armed-conflict standards.

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U.S. military manuals about the law of war discuss perfidy at length, saying it includes when a combatant feigns civilian status so the adversary “neglects to take precautions which are otherwise necessary.” A U.S. Navy handbook says lawful combatants at sea use offensive force “within the bounds of military honor, particularly without resort to perfidy,” and stresses that commanders have a “duty” to “distinguish their own forces from the civilian population.”

Not Rallying Around the Flag

Many posts have discussed foreign policy, war powers and the US military. This weekend, the US snatched Maduro.

Bart Jansen at USA Today:

One in three Americans approve of the U.S. military strike to remove Nicolás Maduro from the presidency of Venezuela to face federal drug-trafficking charges, according to a Reuters/Ipsos poll released Jan. 5.

In contrast, 72% of respondents worried about the United States becoming too involved in the South American country.

The two-day poll found a sharp partisan divide over the raid that President Donald Trump ordered, with his approval rating at 42%. The results found 65% of Republicans back the military operation, compared to 11% of Democrats and 23% of independents.

The Donroe Doctrine

Many posts have discussed foreign policy, war powers and the US military.  Yesterday, the US snatched Maduro.

Yesterday, Trump said:

Furthermore, under the now deposed dictator Maduro, Venezuela was increasingly hosting foreign adversaries in our region and acquiring menacing offensive weapons that could threaten US interest in lives. And they used those weapons last night. They used those weapons last night, potentially in league with the cartels operating along our border.

All of these actions were in gross violation of the core principles of American foreign policy dating back more than two centuries, and, uh, not anymore. All the way back, it dated to the Monroe Doctrines, and the Mo- -- Monroe Doctrine is a, a big deal, but we've superseded it by a lot. By a real lot. They now call it the "Donroe" Document.

I don't know. It's, uh, Monroe Doctrine. We sort of forgot about it. It was very important, but we forgot about it. We don't forget about it anymore. Under our new national security strategy, American dominance in the Western hemisphere will never be questioned again. Won't happen. So, just in concluding, for decades, other administrations have neglected or even contributed to these growing security threats in the Western hemisphere.

 George F. Will at WP:

Universalism flows from the ninth word of the most important sentence in this creedal nation’s catechism: “all.” All human beings are endowed with unalienable rights, including the right to government legitimated by consent. The perennial American argument concerns what, if anything, this catechism commits the nation to do.

Twenty-one years ago, George W. Bush’s second inaugural address proclaimed “the calling of our time” to be nothing less than “ending tyranny in our world.” This project has not fared well since then.

The 1823 Monroe Doctrine declared the Western Hemisphere closed to further European colonization, and, implicitly, open to U.S. intervention in order to guarantee … Here things become murky. Commercial considerations (long ago, bananas; today, oil) and geopolitics have driven interventions.

The doctrine, although promulgated by President James Monroe, should be called the Adams Doctrine, for his secretary of state, John Quincy Adams. (The Marshall Plan, announced in a brief Harvard commencement speech by Harry Truman’s secretary of state, George Marshall, is not known as the Truman Plan.)

Although European colonization in this hemisphere long ago subsided, perhaps the Monroe Doctrine is still apposite. But two years before the Monroe Doctrine was enunciated, Secretary Adams said of our nation:

“Wherever the standard of freedom and independence has been or shall be unfurled, there will her heart, her benedictions and her prayers be. But she goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own.”

Jack Goldsmith:

In sum, it would not be terribly hard for the Justice Department to write an opinion in support of the Venezuela invasion even if the military action violates the U.N. Charter.

To repeat, that does not mean that the action is in fact lawful—and it pretty clearly isn’t under the U.N. Charter. It only means that the long line of unilateral executive branch actions, supported by promiscuously generous executive branch legal opinions, support it. As I wrote in connection with the Soleimani strike: “our country has—through presidential aggrandizement accompanied by congressional authorization, delegation, and acquiescence—given one person, the president, a sprawling military and enormous discretion to use it in ways that can easily lead to a massive war. That is our system: One person decides.”

This is not the system the framers had in mind, and it is a dangerous system for all the reasons the framers worried about. But that is where we are—and indeed, it is where we have been for a while.

The Separation of Powers at the Start of 2026

Many posts have discussed the separation of powers, which is rapidly eroding.

Zachary S. Price at The Atlantic:

In just the past 11 months, his administration has canceled billions of dollars in foreign aid, frozen billions of dollars in research grants, imposed new conditions on other grants and contracts, slashed agency staffs, and even sought to claw back certain prior grant payments. At the same time, it has employed military resources to assist immigration enforcement, offered civil-service buyouts without statutory authority, and reportedly used a private donation to help pay military salaries during this fall’s government shutdown.

 

"But Wiles conceded that attacking targets on Venezuela’s mainland would force Trump to get congressional approval. 'If he were to authorize some activity on land, then it’s war, then [we’d need] Congress.'"

- White House Chief of Staff Susie Wiles, November 2025 interview pic.twitter.com/xeajLbi3tM

— Ryan Goodman (@rgoodlaw) January 3, 2026

Without congressional authorization, the US military just attacked Venezuela and grabbed Maduro/

A War Crime and an Act of War

A WP report suggests the Secretary of Defense Hegseth committed a war crime.

 

Former US military lawyers speak out

"The Former JAGs Working Group unanimously considers both the giving and the execution of these orders, if true, to constitute war crimes, murder, or both"

Statement on Media Reports of Pentagon “No Quarter” Orders in Caribbean Boat Strikes pic.twitter.com/eXo0bs4zyb

— Ryan Goodman (@rgoodlaw) November 29, 2025

The president of the United States may not order offensive military action in or against Venezuela without congressional approval.

Not the Constitution nor the War Powers Resolution nor past AUMFs authorize such hostilities.

Any such orders are unconstitutional and unlawful. https://t.co/jo6UVS6K1y

— Justin Amash (@justinamash) November 29, 2025

Tyler Pager at NYT:

President Trump and his top aides have said that drug cartels present one of the most pressing dangers to the United States, and have promised to eradicate them from the Western Hemisphere.

As part of that effort, Mr. Trump signaled on Saturday that he was ratcheting up his campaign against drug cartels, saying in a social media post that airspace above and surrounding Venezuela should be considered “CLOSED IN ITS ENTIRETY.”

Less than 24 hours earlier, Mr. Trump had announced on social media that he was granting a full pardon to Juan Orlando Hernández, a former president of Honduras who had been convicted in the United States of drug trafficking charges in what was seen as a major victory for authorities in a case against a former head of state. That pardon has not yet been officially granted.

The two posts displayed a remarkable dissonance in the president’s strategy, as he moved to escalate a military campaign against drug trafficking while ordering the release of a man prosecutors said had taken “cocaine-fueled bribes” from cartels and “protected their drugs with the full power and strength of the state — military, police and justice system.” In fact, prosecutors said that Mr. Hernández, for years, allowed bricks of cocaine from Venezuela to flow through Honduras en route to the United States.

A Looming Act of War

 Previous posts have discussed presidential decisions to kill suspected terrorists. (See NYT story on the "kill list.") 

Columbia law professor Matthew C. Waxman at CFR:

Trump reportedly determined and notified Congress that the U.S. government is involved in an “armed conflict”—i.e. a legal state of war— with drug cartels, marking the latest in an escalating series of legal moves by the administration. It previously designated some cartels as FTOs, unlocking certain criminal law, immigration, and sanctions authorities. It has invoked a 1798 law authorizing the swift removal from the United States of “enemy aliens,” and applied it to suspected Tren de Aragua members. It has used lethal force against alleged Tren de Aragua drug vessels in the Caribbean, claiming national self-defense.

One of the most significant implications of this declaration is that it purports to justify using lethal force against some unspecified categories of cartel members, essentially treating them as enemy soldiers. Because the Trump administration has provided so little information about the strikes and their legal justifications, however, it’s unclear how far the White House is stretching this theory.

The closest analogy is the ongoing armed conflict against al-Qaeda and its affiliates, which is a more legally precise term for the “Global War on Terror.” That’s been the legal basis, across five presidential administrations now, for lethal force and detention of al-Qaeda fighters. The Trump administration seems to be applying that same template, but this time against drug cartels instead of a transnational terrorist group.

But that’s a dangerous stretch. Al-Qaeda had declared war on the United States and attacked U.S. warships, embassies, military headquarters, and financial capital, killing thousands of Americans with the equivalent of missiles. If a state had carried out those attacks, no one would dispute that we were in a war.

Major international cartels are brutally violent and drug trafficking is an enormously destructive problem in the United States, so the Trump administration is right to combat them aggressively. The administration may also believe, with reason, that international drug trafficking is a grave threat to the safety of Americans, and perhaps there are important roles for American military forces in dealing with it. But, to date, the administration hasn’t persuasively made the legal case that drug cartels are waging war against us like al-Qaeda was, nor is it clear whether the White House acknowledges any limits to its theory—one that unlocks the most extreme legal powers a state can wield. Part of the problem is that the Trump administration has been so opaque about its legal basis and about the facts surrounding its recent strikes. That’s a mistake that exacerbates the legal problems.

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So far, the Trump administration has used lethal force against drug vessels at sea, but it has also suggested that it might do so in the territory of other states, like Venezuela or Mexico. That would be a major escalation, and it raises additional legal issues because the UN Charter prohibits the use of force against the territorial integrity of UN member states. Unless those states consent, which is unlikely, the administration would probably claim that it was justified because they were unwilling or unable to neutralize the threat against the United States. That would be a radical extension of past precedents, and I believe a misguided one.

Killing Drug Trafficking Suspects

 Previous posts have discussed presidential decisions to kill suspected terrorists. (See NYT story on the "kill list.") 

Politico Playbook:

The president appears to be pushing regime change in Venezuela, and yesterday confirmed a big NYT scoop that he’s authorised CIA activity in the country. And after deadly strikes on six Venezuelan ships in the Caribbean he says were drug smugglers, Trump is now considering mainland targets. “We are certainly looking at land [strikes] now,” Trump said. “We’ve got the sea very well under control.”

In 2013, Sen. Rand Paul filibustered against drone strikes. 

Rand Paul at Reason:

Jake Romm puts the dilemma of whom to designate as a terrorist into sharp relief: "The hollowness and malleability of the term [terrorism] means that it can be applied to groups regardless of their actual conduct and regardless of their actual ideology. It admits only a circular definition…that a terrorist is someone who carries out terrorist acts, and a terrorist act is violence carried out by a terrorist. Conversely, if someone is killed, it is because they are a terrorist, because to be a terrorist means to be killable."

Few independent legal scholars argue the strikes are legal. Even John Yoo—a former deputy assistant attorney general under President George W. Bush, who infamously authored the Bush administration's legal justification for "enhanced interrogation techniques"—has criticized the Trump administration's justification for the strikes, saying: "There has to be a line between crime and war. We can't just consider anything that harms the country to be a matter for the military. Because that could potentially include every crime."

Jon Duffy, a retired Navy Captain, eloquently summarizes our current moment: "A republic that allows its leaders to kill without law, to wage war without strategy, and to deploy troops without limit is a republic in deep peril. Congress will not stop it. The courts will not stop it. That leaves those sworn not to a man, but to the Constitution."

Congress must not allow the executive branch to become judge, jury, and executioner. President Thomas Jefferson understood the framers' intention that the president defer to Congress on matters of offensive war. That's why Jefferson, when faced with the belligerence of the Barbary pirates in 1801, recognized that he was "unauthorized by the Constitution, without the sanction of Congress, to go beyond the line of defense."

Jefferson wanted the authority to act offensively against the pirates, but he respected the intentional checks placed on the executive within the Constitution. Only after Congress passed an "Act for the Protection of Commerce and Seamen of the United States, against the Tripolitan Cruisers" in February 1802, did he order offensive naval operations. If the Trump administration wants to use military power, it should seek authorization from Congress. And Congress must have the courage as the people's representatives to reassert its constitutional duty to decide matters of war and peace.

Extrajudicial Killing

 Tom Nichols at The Atlantic writes about deadly military attacks against boats in international waters:

The Trump administration’s justification for these strikes, such as it is, seems to be that any shipment of drugs connected to the Venezuelan gang Tren de Aragua is a direct threat to the United States. These “narco-terrorists” may therefore be destroyed on sight, and without the fuss of asking permission from the U.S. Congress. This argument reflects the president’s childlike but dangerous understanding of his role as commander in chief. The United States, once the leader of a global system of security and economic cooperation, is now acting like a rogue state on the high seas.

The White House position is wrong on many levels. I taught the rules and theories that govern the use of force to military officers at the Naval War College for many years, and every summer for two decades to civilians at Harvard; I always reminded students that international law and traditions require states to show that they are acting in some form of self-defense, either in response to an attack or to forestall more violence. Moreover, American law does not permit the president to designate people as terrorists and then declare open season on them in defiance of international agreements and without any involvement from Congress. Perhaps Trump’s people are watching too many Tom Clancy movies, but he cannot legally send the Navy out onto the world’s oceans as though they are seagoing sheriffs with satchels full of death warrants.

No one in the White House seems to care very much about the rules that govern killing people, at home or abroad, but these rules actually exist. International law allows interdicting contraband—drugs, weapons, captured human beings—under many circumstances, and countries execute such missions legally every day. These activities require great care to limit the danger to the military and the loss of civilian life, including diligently identifying suspect vessels, warning them to stop, and sometimes boarding them to identify and seize their cargo.

Military ships can engage these targets in combat under limited conditions. If they open fire on American vessels, for example, no one would deny that they’re signing their own death warrant. But in general, when states want to initiate the use of force in the international arena, their arguments are subject to what international law calls “the Caroline test,” an 1837 case that led the U.S. to agree that to employ force, a threat must be “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation.” This is an elegant way of saying that nations can use violence in self-defense when they have neither the time nor ability to do anything else. What constitutes an “imminent” threat is an ongoing debate among international lawyers, but the recent Venezuela strikes do not appear to fall even remotely under any of this doctrine.

Presidential Power to Use Military Overseas

Many posts have discussed war powers and the US military.

Brian Finucane at Just Security:

On Sept. 2nd, the Trump administration announced what it described as a “lethal strike” against an alleged drug smuggling vessel in the Caribbean. In a post on social media accompanied with a video of the strike, President Donald Trump stated that the attack was “against positively identified Tren de Aragua Narcoterrorists.” Trump also noted that Tren de Aragua had previously been designated as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO). The social media post also asserted that the strike had occurred in international waters and killed “11 terrorists.”

Although the facts are still emerging, the Trump administration’s extraordinary lethal attack on this purported smuggling vessel – and its vow that the strike was a start of a campaign – raise a number of significant potential legal issues. And even apart from these legal concerns, the strike constitutes a deeply troubling gratuitous use of the military that resulted in the unnecessary killing of 11 individuals.

In 2019, Navy SEALs were on a secret, possibly illegal mission to plant a listening device on the dictator of North Korea. Dave Philipps and Matthew Cole at NYT:

The mission had the potential to provide the United States with a stream of valuable intelligence. But it meant putting American commandos on North Korean soil — a move that, if detected, not only could sink negotiations but also could lead to a hostage crisis or an escalating conflict with a nuclear-armed foe.

It was so risky that it required the president’s direct approval.

For the operation, the military chose SEAL Team 6’s Red Squadron — the same unit that killed Osama bin Laden. The SEALs rehearsed for months, aware that every move needed to be perfect. But when they reached what they thought was a deserted shore that night, wearing black wet suits and night-vision goggles, the mission swiftly unraveled.

A North Korean boat appeared out of the dark. Flashlights from the bow swept over the water. Fearing that they had been spotted, the SEALs opened fire. Within seconds, everyone on the North Korean boat was dead.

The SEALs retreated into the sea without planting the listening device.

The 2019 operation has never been publicly acknowledged, or even hinted at, by the United States or North Korea. The details remain classified and are being reported here for the first time. The Trump administration did not notify key members of Congress who oversee intelligence operations, before or after the mission. The lack of notification may have violated the law.

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In 2019, Mr. Trump was making a personalized overture to Mr. Kim, in search of a breakthrough that had eluded prior presidents. But those talks collapsed, and North Korea’s nuclear program accelerated. The U.S. government estimates that North Korea now has roughly 50 nuclear weapons and missiles that can reach the West Coast. Mr. Kim has pledged to keep expanding his nuclear program “exponentially” to deter what he calls U.S. provocations

Charlie Savage at NYT:

Should the intelligence committees have been told?

That turns in part on whether the operation was undertaken under military legal authorities, found in Title 10 of the United States Code, or under intelligence authorities, found in Title 50.

A major difference is that Title 50 allows so-called covert operations, in which the United States government intends to conceal its role and deny any involvement if something comes to light. Typically those are conducted by the C.I.A., but sometimes military forces are temporarily put under C.I.A. control to carry out covert activities.

If the government is going to carry out a covert activity, Title 50 generally requires presidents to first make a written “finding” and inform the intelligence committees within 48 hours. Another part of the statute requires notice of “any significant undertaking pursuant to a previously approved finding,” but does not specify a deadline.

Other provisions in Title 50 require the executive branch to provide reports to the intelligence committees that keep them “fully and currently informed” about all intelligence activities — whether covert or not, and including any “significant failures” — no matter which agency or department conducts them.

Federal Judge on the Alien Enemies Act

US District Judge Fernando Rodriguez Jr. -- a Trump appointee -- barred the administration from using the Alien Enemies Act to deport Venezuelans from the Southern District of Texas,

[The] political question doctrine prohibits the Court from weighing the truth of those factual statements, including whether Maduro directs TdA’s actions or the extent of the referenced criminal activity. Instead, the Court determines whether the factual statements in the Proclamation, taken as true, describe an “invasion” or “predatory incursion” for purposes of the AEA.

Based on the plain, ordinary meaning of those terms in the late 1790’s, the Court concludes that the factual statements do not. The Proclamation makes no reference to and in no manner suggests that a threat exists of an organized, armed group of individuals entering the United States at the direction of Venezuela to conquer the country or assume control over a portion of the nation. Thus, the Proclamation’s language cannot be read as describing conduct that falls within the meaning of “invasion” for purposes of the AEA. As for “predatory incursion,” the Proclamation does not describe an armed group of individuals entering the United States as an organized unit to attack a city, coastal town, or other defined geographical area, with the purpose of plundering or destroying property and lives. While the Proclamation references that TdA members have harmed lives in the United States and engage in crime, the Proclamation does not suggest that they have done so through an organized armed attack, or that Venezuela has threatened or attempted such an attack through TdA members. As a result, the Proclamation also falls short of describing a “predatory incursion” as that concept was understood at the time of the AEA’s enactment.11 For these reasons, the Court concludes that the President’s invocation of the AEA through the Proclamation exceeds the scope of the statute and, as a result, is unlawful. Respondents do not possess the lawful authority under the AEA, and based on the Proclamation, to detain Venezuelan aliens, transfer them within the United States, or remove them from the country.