Grievances

 Many posts have discussed the Founding.

Ryan Goodman, Jack Palmer-Coole, Siven Watt and Simone Lipkind at Just Security:

Americans commemorate the 250th anniversary of the signing of the Declaration of Independence this year. As many in the United States and around the world reflect on the words in the solemn document, it will be readily apparent how the actions of the monarch that prompted the “grievances” of the settlers are echoed by the actions taken by the current presidential administration in its first year and a half. 

We believe there is an important history lesson in simply reading, and rereading, the Declaration and reflecting on the current times in the United States. In the passages below, the text of the Declaration is annotated with the words of federal judges in 52 court cases involving the current administration. We have identified 17 of the 27 grievances with a contemporary analog.

Over the past months, different studies published at Just Security have closely documented how the federal courts have adjudicated Americans’ attempts to vindicate their rights against administration policies. The gravity of the judges’ conclusions are sobering. Indeed, reading the Declaration and their words side-by-side shows how much the very fabric of the American social contract is being tested. Today’s federal judiciary, no less than the signatories of the Declaration 250 years ago, is speaking to the current generation about the foundational needs of a functional and representative American democracy, with meaningful checks and balances, and above all, a commitment to the rule of law.

....

Grievance 16: For cutting off our Trade with all parts of the world:
Grievance 17: For imposing Taxes on us without our Consent:

Historical grievance: The Boston Port Act (1774) shut down Boston Harbor, the Restraining Acts (1775) barred New England from trading outside the British Empire, and the Prohibitory Act (1775) prohibited American trade altogether (Grievance 16). The Sugar Act (1764), Stamp Act (1765), and Townshend Acts (1767) imposed direct taxation on the colonies without their consent or representation in Parliament (Grievance 17).
Contemporary translation: Executive restriction of international trade (Grievance 16); and executive imposition of tariffs (considered a tax by the Supreme Court) without congressional authorization (Grievance 17).
Strength of contemporary analog: Strong.

“Based on two words separated by 16 others in Section 1702(a)(1)(B) of IEEPA — ‘regulate’ and ‘importation’ — the President asserts the independent power to impose tariffs on imports from any country, of any product, at any rate, for any amount of time. Those words cannot bear such weight.

Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution sets forth the powers of the Legislative Branch. The first Clause of that provision specifies that ‘The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises.’ It is no accident that this power appears first. The power to tax was, Alexander Hamilton explained, ‘the most important of the authorities proposed to be conferred upon the Union.’ It is both a ‘power to destroy’ and a power ‘necessary to the existence and prosperity of a nation’ — ‘the one great power upon which the whole national fabric is based.‘

The power to impose tariffs is ‘very clear[ly] … a branch of the taxing power.’ ‘A tariff,’ after all, ‘is a tax levied on imported goods and services.’ And tariffs ‘raise[] revenue’ — the defining feature of a tax
…
Recognizing the taxing power’s unique importance, and having just fought a revolution motivated in large part by ‘taxation without representation,’ the Framers gave Congress ‘alone … access to the pockets of the people.’ see also Declaration of Independence ¶19[sic]. … They did not vest any part of the taxing power in the Executive Branch.”

“We are therefore skeptical that in IEEPA — and IEEPA alone — Congress hid a delegation of its birth-right power to tax within the quotidian power to ‘regulate.'”

— Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. (W. Bush appointee) — IEEPA as a basis for presidential tariff power (link to Supreme Court opinion)

Tariffs Are Taxes

 Many posts have dealt with tariffs and trade. 

 Kyle Pomerleau at EconoFact:

Tariffs are a tax on imported goods. Tariffs are collected when the tariffed goods enter the United States. Tariffs can be levied either as a fixed percent of the value of an import, a fixed dollar value per imported good, or as a tariff-rate quota, which applies tax when the value of certain imports exceeds a certain threshold (Pomerleau and York 2025).

Like all taxes, tariffs affect the price and quantity of goods on which they are levied. An excise tax increases the price paid by consumers and decreases the price received by sellers of the product. An important issue with any tax is its incidence – by how much do consumer prices rise and by how much does the price received by producers fall? In the case of tariffs, the consumers are domestic residents while the producers are foreign, which has implications for whether the costs of tariffs are borne by American consumers or foreign sellers. The extent to which a tariff is paid by domestic residents is called its pass-through – for example if a 10% tariff results in an increase in the price of domestic goods by 6% then the pass-through is 60%. Research suggests that tariffs are primarily passed through to U.S. importers as higher import prices (Amiti et al 2019) and the extent of price pass-through rises over time. Evidence on the latest round of tariffs suggests that the pass-through is almost 100%, that is, United States consumers are bearing the full costs of tariffs (Gopinath and Neiman 2026). Between March 2025 and May 2026, The price of imported goods rose by 6.8 percent relative to a pre-tariff price trend between March 2025 and May 2026, as measured by a study that tracks the online prices of over 350,000 products sold at five large U.S. retailers. The largest price increases observed were in carpets and other floor coverings (54 percent), other articles of clothing and clothing accessories (24 percent) coffee, tea, and cocoa (16 percent), and fish and seafood (16 percent) (Cavallo, Llamas, and Vazquez, 2025b).

Tariffs that raise the price of imported goods can also result in rising prices of domestically produced goods that compete with those imports. When the price of an imported good rises due to a tariff (or for other reasons), domestic producers who sell goods that compete with those imports raise the price of their goods as well since they have less competitive price pressure from foreign goods (Cavallo, Llamas, and Vazquez, 2025a). Experience from President Trump’s first term suggests that even untaxed complimentary goods can face price increases due to tariffs. For example, the price of clothes dryers rose after tariffs were applied to imported washing machines in 2019. Importantly, the increase in the price of domestically-produced goods generates no tariff revenue for the government.

The burden of tariffs is shared broadly. Research shows that while tariffs burden households of all income levels, they tend to be regressive taxes – that is, they fall proportionally more heavily on lower-income households, who devote a larger share of their income to consumption of goods that are either subject to tariffs or that compete with tariffed imports (Tax Policy Center 2024). As an example, the Tax Policy Center estimated that if the tariffs in place as of December 2025 stayed in place during 2026, they would reduce household after-tax income by 2 percent for the bottom 95 percent of households. At the same time, this tax would reduce after-tax income for the top 1 percent and top 0.1 percent by 1.7 and 1.5 percent, respectively.

More Tariffs

Many posts have dealt with tariffs and trade. 

Ilya Somin at Reason:

Within hours of the Supreme Court's decision striking down his massive IEEPA tariffs in our case challenging them, Donald Trump issued an executive proclamation invoking Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 to impose 10% global tariffs, and then upped the rate to 15%. Prominent conservative legal commentator Andrew McCarthy has an insightful National Review article explaining why these new tariffs are also illegal. McCarthy and I differ over many issues. But we agree on this one. Here's an excerpt:

These new tariffs are even more clearly illegal than Trump's IEEPA tariffs…..

In Section 122, Congress endowed the president with narrow, temporary authority to impose tariffs "to deal with large and serious United States balance-of-payments deficits" (emphasis added). What Trump is complaining about — something he insists is a crisis but is not — is the balance of trade, not of payments. The United States does not have an overall balance of payments deficit, much less a large and serious one.

A trade deficit between the U.S. and a foreign nation occurs, mainly in connection with goods (which is just one aspect of international commerce), when imports are greater than exports. This is not really a problem for a variety of reasons — e.g., a trade deficit results in an investment surplus, the U.S. is a major services economy and often runs exported services surpluses that mitigate the imports deficit in goods, etc.

The balance of payments is a broader concept than the balance of trade. It accounts for all the economic transactions that take place between the United States and the rest of the world. Even without getting into every kind of transaction that entails, suffice it to say that foreign investment in the United States, coupled with the advantages our nation accrues because the dollar is the world's reserve currency, more than make up for the longstanding trade deficit in goods.

Our overall payments are in balance. There is no crisis.

Gorsuch on Tariffs, Deliberation, and the Separation of Powers

Many posts have discussed the presidency.

By a 6-3 vote, SCOTUS ruled that President Trump exceeded his authority under the 1977 International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to impose tariffs.

Justice Gorsuch's Concurrence in  Learning Resources Inc. v. Trump:

And, of course, it was duties on foreign tea that triggered the Boston Tea Party. J. Ellis, The Cause 17–18 (2021). Are we really to believe that the patriots that night in Boston Harbor considered the whole of the tariff power some kingly prerogative?

...

For those who think it important for the Nation to impose more tariffs, I understand that today’s decision will be disappointing. All I can offer them is that most major decisions affecting the rights and responsibilities of the American people (including the duty to pay taxes and tariffs) are funneled through the legislative process for a reason.  Yes, legislating can be hard and take time.  And, yes, it can be tempting to bypass Congress when some pressing problem arises. But the deliberative nature of the legislative process was the whole point of its design.  Through that process, the Nation can tap the combined wisdom of the people’s elected representatives, not just that of one faction or man.  There, deliberation tempers impulse, and compromise hammers disagreements into workable solutions.  And because laws must earn such broad support to survive the legislative process, they tend to endure, allowing ordinary people to plan their lives in ways they cannot when the rules shift from day to day. In all, the legislative process helps ensure each of us has a stake in the laws that govern us and in the Nation’s future.  For some today, the weight of those virtues is apparent. For others, it may not seem so obvious.  But if history is any guide, the tables will turn and the day will come when those disappointed by today’s result will appreciate the legislative process for the bulwark of liberty it is. 

Tariffs: An Own Goal

Many posts have dealt with tariffs and trade. 

From the Kiel Institute:

Although the US government intended the tariffs to target foreign businesses, the policy actually harms the domestic economy. "The tariffs are an own goal," says Julian Hinz, Research Director at the Kiel Institute and one of the authors of the study. "The claim that foreign countries pay these tariffs is a myth. The data show the opposite: Americans are footing the bill." The tariffs act like a consumption tax on imported goods. At the same time, both the variety and volume of available products decrease.

The research team analysed more than 25 million shipment records covering a total value of almost four trillion US dollars in US imports. The findings are clear:

• US customs revenue increased by approximately 200 billion US dollars in 2025.
• Foreign exporters absorbed only about four percent of the tariff burden, 96 percent passed through to US buyers.
• Trade volumes collapsed, but export prices did not fall.

Falling import volumes

The study also examines the unexpected tariff hikes imposed on Brazil and India in August 2025: tariffs on Brazilian imports were suddenly raised to 50 percent, and for India, from 25 to 50 percent. Again, the data show that foreign exporters did not lower their prices to offset the additional tariffs. Had exporters absorbed the tariffs, their US prices would have fallen relative to other markets—but this was not the case.

"We compared Indian exports to the US with shipments to Europe and Canada and identified a clear pattern," Hinz explains. "Both export value and volume to the US dropped sharply, by up to 24 percent. But unit prices—the prices Indian exporters charged—remained unchanged. They shipped less, not cheaper."

Global impact

Ultimately, these findings mean that US companies will be confronted with shrinking margins and consumers with higher prices in the long run. Countries that export to the US will sell less and will be under pressure to find new export markets. "Tariffs ultimately disadvantage everyone," says Hinz.
About the Study

"America’s Own Goal: Who Pays the Tariffs?" by Julian Hinz, Aaron Lohmann, Hendrik Mahlkow, and Anna Vorwig. Kiel Institute for the World Economy, January 2026.

The authors drew on daily shipment-level bill-of-lading data from Panjiva, official US Census Bureau statistics, and Indian customs records to trace tariff pass-through at unprecedented granularity.

Nondelegation

Many posts have dealt with tariffs and trade. U.S. Solicitor General D. John Sauer argued that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act gave Trump the power to impose tariffs.

 JUSTICE GORSUCH:  You're saying there's inherent authority in foreign affairs, all foreign affairs, so regulate commerce, duties and --and --and --and tariffs and war. It's inherent authority all the way down, you say.  Fine. Congress decides tomorrow, well, we're tired of this legislating business.  We're just going to hand it all off to the President. What would stop Congress from doing that? 

GENERAL SAUER:  That would be different than a situation where there are metes and bounds, so to speak. It would be a wholesale abdication.

 JUSTICE GORSUCH:  You say we --we -- we are not here to judge metes and bounds when the foreign affairs.  That's what I'm struggling with. You'd have to have some test. And if it isn't the intelligible principle test or something more --with more bite than that, you're saying it's something less.  Well, what is that less? 

GENERAL SAUER:  I think what the Court has said in its opinions is just that it applies with much less force, more limited application in this context. So perhaps the right way to approach it is a very, very deferential application of the intelligible --intelligible principle test, that --that sort of wholesale abdication of --don't like to -- 

JUSTICE GORSUCH:  All right.  So now you're admitting that there is some nondelegation principle at play here and, therefore, major questions as well, is that right?

 GENERAL SAUER:  If so, very limited, you know, very, very deferential -- 

JUSTICE GORSUCH:  Okay. 

GENERAL SAUER:  --and limited is what --and, again, the phrase that Justice Jackson used is it just does not apply, at least --

 JUSTICE GORSUCH:  I know, but that's where you started off, and now you've retreated from that as I understand it. 

GENERAL SAUER:  Well, I think we would as our frontline position assert a stronger position, but if the Court doesn't accept it, then, if there is a highly deferential version --

 JUSTICE GORSUCH:  Can you give me a reason to accept it, though? That's what I'm struggling and waiting for.  What's the reason to accept the notion that Congress can hand off the power to declare war to the President? 

GENERAL SAUER:  Well, we don't contend that. Again, that would be --

JUSTICE GORSUCH:  Well, you do.  You say it's unreviewable, that there's no manageable standard, nothing to be done.  And now you're --I think you --tell me if I'm wrong. You've backed off that position. 

GENERAL SAUER:  Maybe that's fair to say.

 JUSTICE GORSUCH:  Okay. All right. Thank you. (Laughter.)

Brief Against Tariffs

Many posts have dealt with tariffs and trade.

Senators Jeanne Shaheen and Ron Wyden, together with colleagues, filed an amicus brief against Trump tariffs: 

The Federal Circuit, Court of International Trade, and District Court for the District of Columbia all reached the same correct conclusion: the President’s imposition of tariffs under IEEPA is unlawful. 

Only Congress has the power to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises,” U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 1 and to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,” id., cl. 3. This reflects the Framers’ intent for the most democratically accountable branch—the one closest to the People—to be responsible for enacting taxes, duties, and tariffs. Hamilton, Federalist Nos. 31–36, The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation (Jan. 1788)

Congress enacted IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1710, to provide the President with the power to impose sanctions, export controls, and similar measures. It provides the President with defined powers to address national emergencies but does not confer the power to impose or remove tariffs.

Neither the word “duties” nor the word “tariffs” appears anywhere in IEEPA. Rather, IEEPA allows the President, in times of a declared emergency, to “regulate … importation or exportation” of property. 50 U.S.C.  § 1702(a)(1)(B). IEEPA’s delegated power to “regulate” is not a power to impose tariffs.

IEEPA contains none of the hallmarks of legislation delegating tariff power to the executive, such as limitations tied to specific products or countries, caps on the amount of tariff increases, procedural safeguards, public input, collaboration with Congress, or time limitations. In the five decades since IEEPA’s enactment, no President from either party, until now, has ever invoked IEEPA to impose tariffs.

The Administration’s interpretation of IEEPA would effectively nullify the guardrails set forth in every statute in which Congress expressly granted the President limited tariff authority—a result Congress did not intend.

Contrary to the views expressed by the Administration and the Federal Circuit dissent, IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose tariffs as “bargaining chips.” While this Court has held that Presidents may use IEEPA to freeze foreign assets and to then use those frozen assets as leverage in foreign affairs negotiations, Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 673 (1981), IEEPA does not grant the President the power to impose tariffs on American citizens importing goods to generate leverage in trade talks. Nor may the President use IEEPA to override America’s trade statutes, which Congress has carefully considered and enacted over the years. The President “is not free from the ordinary controls and checks of Congress merely because foreign affairs are at issue.” Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 21 (2015)

This Court should hold that IEEPA does not delegate tariff authority to the President and the President’s tariffs under IEEPA are therefore unlawful.

Tariffs Harm Manufacturing Employment

Many posts have dealt with tariffs and trade.

Terry Lane at Investopedia:

One benefit of U.S. tariffs on foreign imports is that they are supposed to spur an increase in domestic manufacturing. So far, tariffs seem to be having the opposite effect.

A closely followed survey of manufacturers indicated that the sector contracted for the sixth straight month in August, despite some signs of improvement. However, the data also showed that manufacturers struggle to handle the impact of tariffs while contending with higher prices for materials and lower spending from cautious buyers.

The Institute of Supply Management (ISM) manufacturing sector Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) improved to 48.7 in August, but still fell short of the 50 mark that indicates growth.1 The data showed that high input prices and elevated supply pressures from tariffs helped to wipe out improvements in new orders and employment levels.

“Uncertainty around tariff policy is limiting activity,” wrote Wells Fargo economists Shannon Grein and Tim Quinlan.2 “While the higher costs associated with tariffs are a challenge, the uncertainty around where tariffs ultimately land is likely more so limiting current activity today.”

Court: Trump Tariffs Are Illegal

Many posts have dealt with tariffs and trade.

Tony Romm and Ana Swanson at NYT:

A federal appeals court ruled on Friday that many of President Trump’s most punishing tariffs were illegal, delivering a major setback to Mr. Trump’s agenda that may severely undercut his primary source of leverage in an expanding global trade war.

The ruling, from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, affirmed a lower court’s initial finding in May that Mr. Trump did not possess unlimited authority to impose taxes on nearly all imports to the United States. But the appellate judges delayed the enforcement of their order until mid-October, allowing the tariffs to remain in place so that the administration can appeal the case to the Supreme Court.

The adverse ruling still cast doubt on the centerpiece of Mr. Trump’s trade strategy, which relies on a 1970s law to impose sweeping duties on dozens of the country’s trading partners. Mr. Trump has harnessed that law — the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, or IEEPA — to raise revenue and to pressure other countries into brokering favorable deals. The law has typically been reserved for sanctions and embargoes against other nations.

From the ruling: 

The Constitution grants Congress the power to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises” and to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3. Tariffs are a tax, and the Framers of the Constitution expressly contemplated the exclusive grant of taxing power to the legislative branch; when Patrick Henry expressed concern that the President “may easily become king,” 3 Debates in the Several State Conventions 58 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836), James Madison replied that this would not occur because “[t]he purse is in the hands of the representatives of the people,” id. at 393. 

... 

IEEPA provides that, after declaring a national emergency pursuant to the NEA, the President may “investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any . . . importation or exportation of . . . any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest.” 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B). Notably, IEEPA does not use the words “tariffs” or “duties,” nor any similar terms like “customs,” “taxes,” or “imposts.” IEEPA also does not have a residual clause granting the President powers beyond those which are explicitly listed. 

Tariffs and Inflation

Many posts have dealt with tariffs and trade.

Emily Peck and Joann Muller at Axios:

Where it stands: Reality is biting. At the beginning of the month, the U.S. started levying tariffs of about 15% on dozens of countries. That was on top of China tariffs of 30%.Companies are "coming to the point where their margins are getting squeezed and they need to start passing that onto consumers," Beth Hammack, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, told CBS News earlier this month.

Zoom in: Home Depot had been able to maintain prices on imported products because they'd stockpiled before tariffs took effect. But now, the company expects "modest price movement in some categories" (corporate speak for price increases), an executive said on a call with investors Tuesday. Last month, Procter & Gamble, maker of toothpaste, laundry detergent, etc., said that it would raise prices in August on about a quarter of its products as a result of tariffs.

What to watch: The auto industry could be next. New vehicle prices have been mostly flat as automakers have eaten the cost of tariffs.

Tariff Effects

Many posts have dealt with tariffs and trade.

Ben Casselman at NYT:

Data from the Labor Department on Tuesday showed that overall inflation remained tame in June, but that prices were up sharply in some categories affected by tariffs, such as toys and appliances. The job market, too, is starting to show some cracks, and there are signs consumers have begun to pull back their spending.

Economists expect that evidence to mount in the months ahead, as companies use up inventories built up before the tariffs took effect and begin passing costs on to customers.

“It was always going to take a few months to filter into the hard data,” said Tara Sinclair, an economist at George Washington University.

Economists once expected a much steeper slowdown. But those dire predictions came in response to the punishingly high tariff rates that Mr. Trump announced in early April. Those policies never took effect: The president paused most of the tariffs in response to turmoil in financial markets, and later agreed to temporarily reduce tariffs on China as well.

Even the reduced tariff rates are the highest in decades, and most economists are confident that the policies — and the uncertainty surrounding them — will lead to faster inflation and slower growth. But the damage will be subtler and more gradual than if the duties that Mr. Trump announced in April had taken effect.

"There's a Flip Side to That Coin."

 A number of posts have discussed "Miles' Law," that is, where you stand depends on where you sit.  Attitudes toward procedures and institutions depend on whether you control them.  At Axios, Jim VandeHei and Mike Allen write:

Through silence or vocal support, House and Senate Republicans are backing an extraordinary set of new precedents for presidential power they may come to regret if and when Democrats seize those same powers.

Here are 10 new precedents, all set with minimal GOP dissent: 

1. Presidents can limit the classified information they share with lawmakers after bombing a foreign country without the approval of Congress.
2.  Presidents can usurp Congress's power to levy tariffs, provided they declare a national emergency.
3. Presidents can unilaterally freeze spending approved by Congress, and dismantle or fire the heads of independent agencies established by law.
4. Presidents can take control of a state's National Guard, even if the governor opposes it, and occupy the state for as long as said president wants.
5. Presidents can accept gifts from foreign nations, as large as a $200 million plane, even if it's unclear whether said president gets to keep the plane at the end of the term.
6. Presidents can actively profit from their time in office, including creating new currencies structured to allow foreign nationals to invest anonymously, benefiting said president.
7. Presidents can try to browbeat the Federal Reserve into cutting interest rates, including by floating replacements for the Fed chair before their term is up.
8. Presidents can direct the Justice Department to prosecute their political opponents and punish critics. These punishments can include stripping Secret Service protections, suing them and threatening imprisonment.
9. Presidents can punish media companies, law firms and universities that don't share their viewpoints or values.
10. Presidents can aggressively pardon supporters, including those who made large political donations as part of their bid for freedom. The strength of the case in said pardons is irrelevant.

Between the lines: Friday's Supreme Court ruling limiting nationwide injunctions — a decision widely celebrated by Republicans — underscores the risks of partisan precedent-setting.Conservatives sped to the courts to block many of President Biden's signature policies — and succeeded.

And since losing control of the Senate, Democrats have gone quiet on abolishing the filibuster. 

For decades, Democrats said that the term "states' rights" was coded racism -- until they used the term in defense of same-sex marriage.

Court Strikes Down Tariffs

Many posts have dealt with tariffs and trade.

Conor Friedersdorf at The Atlantic:

The debate over President Donald Trump’s tariffs often focuses on whether they are prudent. Defenders insist that Trump’s tariffs will help make America great again and boost national security. Critics counter that they’ll wreck the economy. But the strongest argument against the tariffs is actually that they are unlawful. Neither the Constitution nor any statute authorizes Trump to impose what he ordered.

Now, months after sticklers for the rule of law began making that argument, it has finally been vindicated: Yesterday, the United States Court of International Trade, the federal court with jurisdiction over civil actions related to tariffs, struck down almost all of Trump’s tariffs in a 49-page ruling. The decision includes a detailed discussion of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, the 1977 law delegating increased power over trade to the president during national emergencies, which the White House had cited to support its moves. It concludes that the law does not authorize any of Trump’s tariff orders.

V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. Trump

State of Oregon v. Trump

Underlying the issues in this case is the notion that “the powers properly belonging to one of the departments ought not to be directly and completely administered by either of the other departments.”  Federalist No. 48 (James Madison).  Because of the Constitution’s express allocation of the tariff power to Congress, see U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, we do not read IEEPA to delegate an unbounded tariff authority to the President.  We instead read IEEPA’s provisions to impose meaningful limits on any such authority it confers.  Two are relevant here.  First, § 1702’s delegation of a power to “regulate . . . importation,” read in light of its legislative history and Congress’s enactment of more narrow, non-emergency legislation, at the very least does not authorize the President to impose unbounded tariffs.  The Worldwide and Retaliatory Tariffs lack any identifiable limits and thus fall outside the scope of § 1702.  Second, IEEPA’s limited authorities may be exercised only to “deal with an unusual and extraordinary threat with respect to which a national emergency has been declared . . . and may not be exercised for any other purpose.”  50 U.S.C. § 1701(b) (emphasis added).  As the Trafficking Tariffs do not meet that condition, they fall outside the scope of § 1701.  

Tariff Power

Many posts have dealt with tariffs and trade.

Philip Wallach at AEI:

The Congress of a new generation doubled down on presidential leadership with the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which also contained Section 232, allowing for tariffs implemented for national security reasons. At the urging of President Richard Nixon, Congress gave the president yet greater powers with the Trade Act of 1974, which created a “fast track” procedure for Congress to consider trade agreements negotiated by the president. Section 301 of that act gave the president the ability to impose new tariffs when a foreign nation’s trade practices were deemed “unreasonable or discriminatory.”

With these two provisions in place, U.S. presidents had tools capable of quickly imposing a broad protectionist program. But while Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush both engaged in some targeted protectionism, it wasn’t until the first presidency of Donald Trump that these powers were employed to their fullest, with Section 232 used to launch steel and aluminum tariffs and Section 301 used to impose a panoply of tariffs on China. The Biden administration largely left those actions intact.

While the second Trump administration’s actions of the last few weeks thus build on a long record of presidential leadership, they nevertheless represent a new chapter—in part because they have an entirely novel legal basis. Trump has claimed the authority to rewrite tariff schedules because America’s trade deficit represents an “emergency” for the nation. This unlocks presidential powers under the International Economic Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA), a law heretofore used as the basis for economic sanctions but not for making trade policy, or so the theory goes. Trump has made it clear that the nature of this emergency requires the president to act as dealmaker-in-chief, which means he must be able to threaten, adjust, and readjust at the drop of a hat if he is to get the best deal for the American people and end our decades-long trade peonage.

Trade War: The Happy Ending or the Horrible Ending

Many posts have dealt with tariffs and trade.

Originally published in La Tercera as “Los aranceles de Trump: El final feliz.”

Trump's trade war has two possible endings. One would be happy. The other could be terrible.

The happy ending would look like the following. China and other nations make minor concessions on trade policy. In return, Trump drops all of the tariffs that he recently imposed. Everyone declares victory, and the global economy returns to normal.

That ending would be consistent with Trump's character. In business, politics, and even golf, he has often pretended to have won contests that he actually lost.

This ending would benefit him politically. His devoted followers believe everything he says, and he could easily convince them that a surrender is a triumph. Other Americans would dismiss his claim of victory, but would be glad to see the trade war come to an end.

The happy ending has to come soon. The longer Trump waits, the more harm he will do to the economy. At some point, the losses will be hard to reverse.

If Trump continues the trade war, Americans will suffer. He keeps suggesting that other countries pay his tariffs. In reality, American importers pay them and pass the cost to American consumers. The result of a prolonged trade war will be inflation. Even worse, economists are predicting that it will lead to a recession.

During bad economic times, the party in power always loses ground. If the 2016 congressional elections occur during a recession, Trump's Republican Party will surely lose its narrow majority in the House of Representatives, and might lose control of the Senate. Democrats will use their newfound power to thwart Trump's policies and investigate his administration. His presidency will end in failure and humiliation.

If Trump is as smart as he claims to be, he will choose the happy ending. But to quote one of his favorite phrases, we'll see what happens.

Trade War Casualties

 

.@The_Budget_Lab has already put out revenue, distributional, inflation, and GDP estimates of the tariffs from yesterday.

-$3,800 hit to average income and $1,700 hit to low-income families when combined with other 2025 tariffs.

-2.3% increase in prices

-0.6% smaller economy pic.twitter.com/Jx3S0lKQL1

— Brendan Duke (@Brendan_Duke) April 3, 2025

Smoot-Hawley Redux

Many posts have dealt with tariffs and trade.

Jason Douglas and Tom Fairless at WSJ:

In the U.S., more than 90% of 5,200 product categories are subject to harmful import restrictions, up from half just before Trump’s first term in office, Global Trade Alert data show. According to the Tax Foundation, a think tank that scrutinizes tax policy, the average tariff rate facing goods imported into the U.S. is now back to where it was in 1946, at 8.4%, compared with 1.5% when Trump first took office in 2016.

If Trump follows through on all his remaining tariff threats, tariffs on U.S. imports could hit 18% on average, Fitch Ratings estimates—the highest level in 90 years.

From the Tax Foundation: 

Tariffs Are Bad

 Phillip W. Magness at Cato:

• James Madison viewed tariffs as necessary to raise revenue but was caught off-guard by early attempts to enact tariffs for industry protection.
• Alexander Hamilton and Henry Clay supported the use of tariffs to stimulate infant industries. However, there’s little evidence the American System of tariffs and industrial subsidies was responsible for American economic growth in the 19th century.
• Contrary to the “national conservative” narrative, many of the leading figures of the American Founding opposed the protectionist arguments of Hamilton and Clay.
• From 1789 to 1934, tariff-seeking industries were notorious for diverting resources into rent-seeking, or the lobbying of Congress for preferential rates with bribes and backroom deals.
• Corruption associated with protectionist tariff policy of the late 19th century directly led to adoption of the 16th Amendment and the federal income tax as an alternative revenue system.
• Modern American trade policy was restructured in 1934 to bypass the disastrous Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, which exacerbated the Great Depression and illustrated the tendency of protectionist tariffs to serve corrupt interest groups.

Americans Pay American Tariffs

Mary Amiti, Stephen J. Redding, David E. Weinstein at NBER:

Using data from 2018, a number of studies have found that recent U.S tariffs have been passed on entirely to U.S. importers and consumers. These results are surprising given that trade theory has long stressed that tariffs applied by a large country should drive down foreign prices. Using another year of data including significant escalations in the trade war, we find that U.S. tariffs continue to be almost entirely borne by U.S. firms and consumers. We show that the response of import values to the tariffs increases in absolute magnitude over time, consistent with the idea that it takes time for firms to reorganize supply chains. We find heterogeneity in the responses of some sectors, such as steel, where tariffs have caused foreign exporters to drop their prices substantially, enabling them to export relatively more than in sectors where tariff passthrough was complete.

Tariffs Don't Work

Flaaen, Aaron, and Justin Pierce (2019). “Disentangling the Effects of the 2018-2019 Tariffs on a Globally Connected U.S. Manufacturing Sector,” Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2019-086. Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
https://doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2019.086  The abstract:

Since the beginning of 2018, the United States has undertaken unprecedented tariff increases, with one goal of these actions being to boost the manufacturing sector. In
this paper, we estimate the effect of the tariffs—including retaliatory tariffs by U.S. trading partners—on manufacturing employment, output, and producer prices. A key
feature of our analysis is accounting for the multiple ways that tariffs might affect the
manufacturing sector, including providing protection for domestic industries, raising
costs for imported inputs, and harming competitiveness in overseas markets due to
retaliatory tariffs. We find that U.S. manufacturing industries more exposed to tariff increases experience relative reductions in employment as a positive effect from import protection is offset by larger negative effects from rising input costs and retaliatory tariffs. Higher tariffs are also associated with relative increases in producer prices via rising input costs.