Mistrust of Government Information

"Every record has been destroyed or falsified, every book has been rewritten, every picture has been repainted, every statue and street and building has been renamed, every date has been altered. And that process is continuing day by day and minute by minute."   -- George Orwell, 1984

A number of posts have discussed presidential documents, official data, and government websites.

AMELIA THOMSON-DEVEAUX and LINLEY SANDERS at AP:

Americans are more skeptical of government information than they were a few years ago, with majorities now saying they have little or no trust in federal government information about elections and politics, foreign affairs or the environment, a new poll finds.

The survey from The Associated Press-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research and USA Facts shows that while mistrust of government information has grown since 2024, it’s also higher than it was at the end of President Donald Trump’s first term, underscoring how his recent attempts to dismantle parts of the federal bureaucracy may have affected public confidence in the executive branch, particularly among Democrats.

Those suspicions extend to the results of the coming midterm elections. Only 34% of U.S. adults trust government certifications of election results “a great deal” or “quite a bit,” which is down slightly from 40% in 2024. Certification is a typically routine process in which local and state officials confirm the vote count, but it’s become politicized since Trump lost the 2020 presidential election.

Trust in government information has also become more partisan since Trump’s first term, the survey found.

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The findings come after a year and a half of upheaval in the executive branch. Trump began to dismantle key parts of the federal bureaucracy soon after entering the White House for the second time, moving to end longstanding programs and shutter entire agencies.

Since then, thousands of federal employees have been fired or left their jobs, substantially reducing the ranks of the government statisticians and leading experts to warn about risks to data quality

Attitudes Toward Muslims

 Many posts have discussed the role of religion in American life.  

Besheer Mohamed at Pew:

The terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, have had a lasting impact on Muslims in the United States. Muslim Americans shared in the nation’s grief and fear that day, and in the months and years that followed, they carried the additional burden of being singled out for suspicion.

Twenty-five years later, some Americans still see Islam and Muslims through the lens of 9/11. Yet Muslims are a growing, vibrant part of America’s religious tapestry, one that has become more politically visible in recent years.

In a Pew Research Center survey this spring, 43% of U.S. adults said Muslims are less patriotic than other Americans, and 42% said Muslim Americans are having a negative impact on the country.

When asked to explain those views in their own words, some survey respondents referred explicitly to the events of 2001 with answers such as “Due to 9/11,” “Remember the twin towers?” and “Fear of another 911 terrorist attack.”

By some measures, public attitudes toward Islam have become more negative than they were immediately after the 9/11 attacks. In March 2002, just six months after the al-Qaida attacks, 25% of U.S. adults said the Islamic religion is more likely than other religions to encourage violence. In 11 subsequent polls, that figure has never been lower than 38%, and in the past decade it has hovered between 45% and 52%. Early this year, about half of U.S. adults surveyed (51%) said Islam encourages violence more than other religions do.

Views on Islam have also become more politically polarized. In this year’s poll, Republicans and independents who lean toward the GOP were far more likely than Democrats and Democratic leaners to say Islam encourages violence (76% vs. 29%). In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the partisan gap was much smaller (32% vs. 23%), perhaps reflecting a messaging campaign by then-President George W. Bush, who called Islam a religion of peace.

Party and Patriotism

 Many posts have discussed patriotism and American exceptionalism.

Ruy Teixeira and Karlyn Bowman at AEI:

The reasons why our politics has been a cold shower for Americans’ patriotism are not hard to discern. One of them is the president. Donald Trump won the Republican nomination in 2016 by framing the U.S. as a nation in terminal decline, and he has frequently drawn a moral equivalence between the actions of foreign dictators and America’s own foreign policy. In the period since Trump overtook the Republican Party, right-wingers have become much more critical about America as it actually exists. And though Trump regularly expresses patriotism, his pageantry and truculent manner have been more polarizing than unifying. He seems to miss no opportunity to associate love of country with his own personal MAGA brand.

But it’s by no means just the fault of Trump and his party. Democrats have long practiced what we might call a “yes, but” approach to patriotism. The general idea is that patriotism is kind of okay but only if it’s immediately linked to the terrible things that America has done in the past and the injustices that still exist today. Simply being patriotic, full stop, is viewed with suspicion if not outright hostility. And on the party’s ascendant far left, the Democratic Socialists of America—which stands to see a number of their members elected to Congress in November—recently released a platform that called for getting rid of the Constitution altogether.

But you don’t just need to look at the radical left to find Democratic objections to patriotism. Just this week, Fox News reported that Christina Bohannan, an Iowa Democrat trying to swing a critical House seat, called patriotism “sensitive and controversial” in a statement she issued in 2021. And last month, moderate Democratic representative Tom Suozzi of New York bemoaned his party’s aversion to patriotism. “The choice Democrats face is clear,” he wrote in The Wall Street Journal. “We can allow patriotism to become a partisan label, or we can reclaim a tradition that rightly belongs to every American.”

Consumer Sentiment and the Perils of Online Polling

Many posts have discussed pollsters' challenges, including the plunge in response rates.

Joel Wertheimer at Silver Bulletin discussed the Index of Consumer Sentiment (ICS):

The University of Michigan ICS is the gold standard sentiment survey measuring consumer sentiment.1 The survey has historically shown a very strong correlation with “hard” economic data such as inflation and unemployment. But before more bad analysis gets done on the vibecession, people need to know they’re working with dubious data. As with election polls, the ICS has struggled amid a shift away from telephone polling. There are issues both with partisan nonresponse, with some political groups more likely to respond than others, and partisan expressive response, with survey-takers using questions about the economy to express political sentiment.

So the problems with the ICS are these:

The switch to online polling made responses more negative and,

There are too many Democrats in the sample.

Thus, ICS data since mid-2024 is not comparable to past periods. Here is the partisanship of the sample over time:

And Democrats right now say they hate the economy with Trump in charge.

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When adjusted for these issues, the ICS should be substantially higher than the Great Recession lows we have witnessed over the past year. Weighting the survey to Pew’s National Public Opinion Reference Survey — what Nate Cohn called “perhaps the most important poll you’ve never heard of” — would place the ICS at a level more like that in 2013, when the economy was growing after the Great Recession but unemployment remained stubbornly high and wages stubbornly low. This adjustment would bring the survey in line with other measures of consumer confidence, such as those from the Conference Board, Gallup, and YouGov.

Politics as a Safety Risk

Many posts have discussed  partisan polarization and political violence.

Benedict Vigers at Pew:

Although Americans are most likely to name road accidents and crime as the two biggest threats to their personal safety, no other population in the world is more likely to identify politics as a safety concern.

According to a 2026 Lloyd's Register Foundation World Risk Poll report, one in 10 U.S. adults identify politics as the greatest source of risk to their personal safety when asked an open-ended question. This is up from 6% in both 2021 and 2023 and 10 times the global average of 1% across 140 countries.

The U.S. statistically ties with Hungary (at 9%, measured several months before the recent election) for the highest percentage of adults identifying politics as their top safety concern. Other countries with relatively high percentages of mentions include Serbia, Latvia and Lithuania (at 6% each) and Slovakia, Russia, Myanmar, Spain and Israel (all at 5%).

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Polarization unites these responses, whether people express it directly or indirectly. Many Democrats cite the current administration, while many Republicans point to the Democratic Party — both indirect demonstrations of polarization. However, others from across the political spectrum name polarization and the wider political climate directly when thinking about risks to their safety:

“I would have to say the state of polarization of the American people.” (Republican, 54, Male)

“I would say political extremism. I don't have a lot of personal risk, but I do feel the biggest risk is people that are fanatical about their position and that they could be violent.” (Independent, 42, Male)

“The political situation has a lot to do with the fact whether if I am safe or not. I am concerned where we're going or might go.” (Democrat, 69, Female)

 

 

Confidence in Institutions 2026

Many posts have discussed confidence in institutions and partisan polarization.

Lydia Saad at Gallup:

Americans’ confidence in U.S. institutions remains historically low, as reflected in their average view of 14 institutions measured each year since 1993. Currently, 27% of Americans express “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in these core institutions, one percentage point above the record-low average in 2023.

When limited to the nine institutions measured about annually since 1979, average confidence is also 27%, reflecting the broader similarity of the two trends. Both lists include a mix of government and private sector institutions, making either version appropriate for use as a barometer of national confidence.

Americans’ average confidence in institutions has been trending downward since 1979 — not gradually, but rather driven by several steep drops. Confidence fell sharply in the early 1980s and again in the early 1990s, each time quickly followed by partial recoveries. An even sharper decline in the mid-2000s associated with the onset of the Great Recession proved more resistant, with confidence remaining at the 2007 low point and sinking even further over the next nine years. Confidence finally showed significant improvement in 2020, at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, due to heightened public trust in several institutions most affected by that crisis — particularly the medical system and public schools. However, average confidence quickly reverted and sunk further to 27% in 2022.

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Partisan differences in confidence were modest through much of the 1980s and early 1990s, with Republicans and Democrats expressing similar levels of confidence regardless of which party controlled the White House. The gap first widened during Bill Clinton's presidency in Democrats' favor before reversing under George W. Bush. It narrowed somewhat during Barack Obama's administration before swinging back toward Republicans during Donald Trump's first term and then toward Democrats during Joe Biden's presidency.

The gap has widened during Trump’s second term, with Republicans now 13 points more confident in U.S. institutions than Democrats are, similar to last year’s 11-point gap. This is due to Democrats, for the first time, showing less confidence in an incoming Republican president at the same time Republicans’ confidence has surged. The finding echoes Democrats’ historically negative outlook on national conditions during Trump’s second term that Gallup reported earlier this year.

 

Fewer Believe God Granted America a Special Role

 Many posts have discussed patriotism and American exceptionalism. Religion is part of the story.

From PRRI:

Just 44% of Americans agree with the idea that God has granted America a special role in human history, compared with a slim majority who disagree (52%). Agreement with this idea was relatively high in the early and mid-2010s, around 60 percent. Beginning in 2020, however, agreement dropped significantly to 40% and has since remained relatively stable in the low-to-mid 40s through 2026.

The partisan gap on American exceptionalism has widened sharply over the past decade. While Republican agreement that God has granted America a special role has remained relatively stable — dipping from 75% in 2012 to 63% in 2022, with about seven in ten agreeing today — Democratic support has collapsed, falling from 60% to just 27%. Independents declined as well, hitting a low of 35% in 2020 before a modest recovery to 40% in 2026.

In 2012, majorities of nearly all religious groups agreed that God has granted America a special role in human history. Today, only four religious subgroups hold this view. Most Latter-day Saints (80%), white evangelical Protestants (75%), Hispanic Protestants (64%), and Black Protestants (52%) agree that God has a special role for America. By contrast, less than half of every other major religious group agrees with this statement, including 49% of white Catholics, 47% of white mainline/ non-evangelical Protestants, 44% of Hispanic Catholics, 34% of Jewish Americans, 32% of other non-Christians, and only 21% of religiously unaffiliated Americans. Since 2022, white evangelical Protestants (from 68%) and religiously unaffiliated Americans (from 16%) have become more likely to agree. 

American Pride Drops and Polarizes

Many posts have discussed patriotism and American exceptionalism.

Megan Brenan at Gallup:

As the United States marks its 250th anniversary, 33% of U.S. adults say they are “extremely proud” to be an American, the lowest reading in Gallup's trend dating back to 2001. Another 20% say they are “very proud,” which means just over half of Americans express high levels of pride in their country.

The remaining shares say they are “moderately proud” (22%), “only a little proud” (15%) or “not at all proud” (9%).
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The current 56-point gap between Republicans’ and Democrats’ reported extreme pride is similar to last year’s 57-point difference, the highest on record. 

No Religious Revival

Many posts have discussed the role of religion in American life.

A release from the Public Religion Research Institute:

The annual PRRI Census of American Religion finds no evidence that Americans are returning to church in higher numbers – and little change in Americans’ religious affiliation in the past year.

Surveying a random sample of 40,000 adults throughout 2025, PRRI finds that two-thirds of Americans (66%) identify as Christian, including 41% who are white Christians and 25% who are Christians of color. Roughly three in ten Americans (28%) are religiously unaffiliated, and 6% identify with a non-Christian religion. All percentages closely mirror those from 2024.

“Despite anecdotal claims of a religious revival, our data show that Americans’ religious affiliation held steady in 2025 while worship weekly attendance did not increase,” said Melissa Deckman, CEO of PRRI. “Looking at young adults, there is a shift happening – but it’s not Gen Z men becoming more religious, as some suggest. Instead, young women’s declining religiosity has brought them on par with their male counterparts for the first time.”

Young women (18-29) have shed religious labels steadily since 2013, when 29% identified as religiously unaffiliated. By 2024, that figure grew to 40%, and in 2025, it increased to 43%.

While there has been a slight pause in the overall rate of religious disaffiliation, religious affiliation did not grow in 2025. The percent of Americans who identify as members of white Christian traditions saw little change between 2024 and 2025.

In 2025, 13% of Americans identify as white evangelical Protestants, 13% as white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants, and 12% as white Catholics — all unchanged from 2024. Fewer than 1% of Americans identify as Orthodox Christian in 2025, also unchanged from 2024. Among Americans ages 18-29, the percentage of white Christians has remained stable between 2024 and 2025 (28% both years).

“Today, white evangelical Protestants comprise just 13% of the American population, and all white Christians together only account for four in ten Americans today,” said Robert P. Jones, president and founder of PRRI. “These changing demographics help explain why — in a desperate gambit to hold onto power — white evangelicals have been willing to give themselves over to the MAGA movement and to turn against the principles of a pluralistic democracy.”

There is little evidence that Americans are returning to church in higher numbers. In 2025, 26% of Americans attend church weekly (unchanged from 2024). More than ten years prior, in 2013, 31% of Americans attended church weekly. The share of Americans who seldom or never attend religious services has increased substantially in the past decade, rising from 42% in 2013 to 53% in 2025.

Just one in five young women (21%) and men (20%) attended church weekly in 2025, which matched their rates of weekly church attendance in 2024. Rates of church attendance among younger Americans have remained largely unchanged since 2013. Younger Americans continue to be less religious than older Americans, in terms of both religious affiliation and regular church attendance

After years of consistent growth, the percentage of religiously unaffiliated Americans has plateaued. In both 2024 and 2025, 28% of Americans did not identify with a religious tradition. Among young Americans (ages 18-29), there is a significant gender gap: 43% of young women identify as unaffiliated in 2025, compared with 35% of young men.

The religious makeup of the two major political parties differs dramatically. White Christians account for a much larger percentage of the Republican Party (68%) than the Democratic Party (23%). Around one-third of Democrats are Christians of color (34%) compared with 16% of Republicans. Democrats are more likely to identify as religiously unaffiliated (34%) or with a non-Christian religion (8%) than Republicans (13% and 4%, respectively). Independents are 36% white Christian, 33% unaffiliated, 24% Christians of color, and 7% non-Christian.

GOP v. Trends in Higher Ed

Many posts have discussed the politics of colleges and universities in the United States.

Schickler E, Rodriguez EM. The College Campus and the Culture War: The Development of Party Polarization on Higher Education, 1980–2025. Studies in American Political Development. Published online 2026:1-21. doi:10.1017/S0898588X26100327

Abstract

We draw on a dataset of 1,044 state and national party platforms from 1980 to 2025 to track the evolution of Democratic and Republican positions with respect to higher education. The sector enjoyed considerable bipartisan support in the 1980s and early 1990s, with both parties generally expressing the view that 4-year colleges and universities contribute to economic vitality and student advancement. Starting in the mid-1990s, Republicans’ position gradually became more critical—even so, there is considerable diversity in views across states as late as 2010. In recent years, the party’s platforms have become almost uniformly negative toward higher education. The first line of GOP criticism focused on concerns about speech and alleged liberal bias. In the past decade, the party increasingly focused its criticism on higher education’s approach to racial and gender/sexuality issues—just as the intensity of opposition ramped up. Democratic platforms show much more stability but have expressed increased concern about college costs since the 2010s. Democrats also became more likely to express a liberal position on race and gender/sexuality policies just as the GOP became more vocal in criticizing these policies from the right. Our evidence suggests that the shift in the GOP’s positioning began at the national level and was instigated by nationally oriented ideological activists rather than mass-level demands. In a highly polarized and nationalized two-party system, the case of higher education illuminates the dangers that exist for any civil society institution when one party becomes hostile to its purposes and orientation.

Decline of Elite-Educated Republican Lawmakers

Many posts have discussed the politics of colleges and universities in the United States.

Volden C, Wai J, Wiseman AE. On the Decline of Elite-Educated Republicans in Congress. Perspectives on Politics. 2026;24(1):256-268. doi:10.1017/S1537592725102260

We identify a rise in educational polarization among members of the US Congress mirroring the educational polarization in the American mass public. Over the past half-century, the percentage of Republican representatives who attended elite educational institutions declined from 40% to 15%, and the percentage of similarly educated Republican senators declined from 55% to 35%, while the ranks of elite-educated Democrats rose in both chambers. These changes across the parties have mapped into observable differences in behavior and approaches toward lawmaking. We find that elite-educated legislators are much more liberal in their voting patterns, suggesting a link between the decline in elite-educated Republicans and ideological polarization in Congress. We also demonstrate that, in the House, elite-educated Democrats are especially effective lawmakers, but not so for elite-educated Republicans. In the Senate, we establish a link between the decline of elite-educated Republicans and the rise of partisan warrior “Gingrich Senators.” Overall, these patterns offer initial glimpses into how political elites are being drawn from different educational cohorts, representing an important transition in American governance.

 

 

Polarized Views of Foreign Policy

Many posts have discussed partisan polarization.

From Gallup: 

Unchurching

Many posts have discussed the role of religion in American life. That role appears to be fading.

Rafael Contreras at Axios:

The U.S. is undergoing its fastest religious shift in modern history, marked by a rapid increase in the religiously unaffiliated and numerous church closures nationwide.

Why it matters: The great unchurching of America comes as identity and reality are increasingly shaped by non-institutional spiritual sources — YouTube mystics, TikTok tarot, digital skeptics, folk saints and AI-generated prayer bots.
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Nearly three in 10 American adults today identify as religiously unaffiliated — a 33% jump since 2013, according to the nonpartisan Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI).That's quicker than almost any major religious shift in modern U.S. history, and it's happening across racial groups, an Axios analysis found.

About four in ten Americans ages 18 to 29 identify as religiously unaffiliated (38%), an increase from 32% in 2013, PRRI said.

Driving the news: The religious shift has made it harder for political parties and candidates to reach voters, Sisto Abeyta, a Democratic political consultant based in New Mexico with the Nevada-based firm TriStrategies, tells Axios."We have to find (religiously unaffiliated voters), engage them and answer their skeptical questions, rather than just go to a church and pass out campaign literature," Abeyta said. "And they're growing in numbers."
It costs campaigns about $1.40 to reach out to a single religiously unaffiliated voter, compared to $ 0.45 per faith-based voter, he said.

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Between the lines: The racial makeup of Christians within each party is vastly different, and that is shaping the influence of faith voters on Democrats' and Republicans' platforms.Within the Republican party, the largest group is white Christians (68%) and only 12% identify as religiously unaffiliated, per PRRI.

Among Democrats, Christians of color (35%) and religiously unaffiliated (34%) make up the bulk of the party.

Zoom out: The shift in religious activity also is leaving behind a trail of "church graveyards," or empty buildings that are now difficult to sell or have been abandoned.These churches once served as community gathering places for Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, voting precincts, or town halls, leaving a void.Megachurches show signs of stability but not enough to reverse overall declines.

Inflammatory Language: Blaming the Other Side

Many posts have discussed partisan polarization.

Jeffrey M. Jones at Gallup:

Larger majorities of Americans than in the past believe that both the Democratic and Republican parties and their supporters have gone too far in using inflammatory language to criticize their opponents. Sixty-nine percent now say this about the Republican Party and Republicans, a 16-percentage-point increase from 2011, and 60% currently believe this applies to the Democratic Party and Democrats, which is nine points higher than 14 years ago.

These results are based on an Oct. 1-16 Gallup poll, which updated a question that had been previously asked in 2011 in the wake of a mass shooting that injured former Democratic Rep. Gabrielle Giffords and killed six. The latest poll was conducted shortly after Republican activist Charlie Kirk was assassinated during an appearance at a Utah college and follows two assassination attempts on Donald Trump in 2024.

Republicans and Democrats are now nearly unanimous in believing the other party has gone too far with its rhetoric and are much more likely to think this than in 2011. Ninety-four percent of Democrats, compared with 74% in 2011, now say Republicans and their supporters have gone too far, and 93% of Republicans (vs. 63% in 2011) say the same about Democrats and their supporters.

Distrust, Frustration, and Anger

Many posts have discussed public trust in institutions and political leaders.

From Pew:

Just 17% of Americans now say they trust the government in Washington to do what is right “just about always” (2%) or “most of the time” (15%).

While trust in government has been low for decades, the current measure is one of the lowest in the nearly seven decades since the question was first asked by the National Election Study, and it is lower than it was last year (22%).

 

Shanay Gracia at Pew:

We regularly ask Americans whether the federal government makes them feel basically content, frustrated or angry. Today, 49% say they feel frustrated. Another 26% say they are angry, and 23% say they are basically content, according to a Pew Research Center survey of 3,445 U.S. adults conducted Sept. 22-28 (just before the 43-day government shutdown)

Frustration is common across the political spectrum regardless of which party holds the presidency. But the shares of Republicans and Democrats feeling anger and contentment shift dramatically depending on who’s in the White House.

Still, the partisan gaps in these views are wider now than at any point since we first asked this question in 1997. The share of Democrats who are angry toward the federal government has hit a new high:

 

The Polarization Problem

Many posts have discussed partisan polarization.

Shane Goldmacher and Ruth Igielnik report on a to a new poll from The New York Times and Siena University

Only 26 percent said the conditions were even good, though that low level represents a slight uptick from 22 percent in the last Times/Siena poll in April.

An open-ended question asking voters to identify the “most important problem” facing the country was even more revealing.

The top issue that Democratic voters, 18 percent of them, identified was Mr. Trump and Republicans — more than those who said they were chiefly concerned with the economy. Nearly as many Republicans, 16 percent, said that Democrats were the nation’s biggest problem.

And independents? Their top concern was polarization and division.

Inequality and Politics

Many posts have discussed economic and educational inequality. The effects of inequality reach many corners of American life.

Dan Merica and Matthew Choi at WP:

One data point in our colleague Gaya Gupta’s write-up of recent findings by the Census Bureau stuck out to us: While most Americans’ household income remained steady or fell because of inflation last year, the wealthiest 10 percent of households saw their incomes rise.

That simple finding — which could easily be boiled down to the aphorism “the rich get richer, the poor get poorer” — explains so much about our populist politics at this moment, from the left gravitating to a strident anti-rich rhetoric and politicians who authentically understand their economic plight to the right embracing President Donald Trump and his simple political message that the system is rigged against most Americans.

It also explains why the cost of living and prices have been the most determinative issues in our politics in recent elections. That was true in 2024, when voters regularly ranked the economy as their most important issue, and the economy remains top of mind now. A study by the Pew Research Center in December found that only 30 percent of Americans are satisfied with their pay, particularly because it has not kept up with rising prices.

“It is reconstituting the types of political coalitions that can be made and changing what sort of policies and actions those voters want,” said Alyssa Cass, a longtime Democratic operative. “Candidates who are tapping into that are the ones who are succeeding most prominently and beating expectations.”

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“Trump is the ultimate disrupter. And many people see him at the tip of the spear against the status quo,” said Jesse Hunt, another longtime Republican operative who has worked in committees and on campaigns. “That is really what he has done since he came down the escalator in 2015. And that gives him a deep connection with a lot of people who don’t feel like their concerns were heard or they were cared about.”

Hunt also argued that social media — and the way in which people let their friends and colleagues into their lives now — has exacerbated this divide. Before social media, people may have felt pressure to keep up economically with their immediate friends and neighbors primarily through word of mouth, Hunt noted. But when all people have to do is log on to a platform to see how those people are living, they receive broader, more in-depth insight into whether they are getting ahead or falling behind.

The Economic Value of College

Many posts have discussed economic and educational inequality. The effects of inequality reach many corners of American life.

Emily Peck at Axios:

The share of Americans who say college is "very important" plummeted over the past decade, new Gallup polling finds.

Why it matters: College may not live up to the American Dream that it promised in the past, and there are other pathways for success becoming more appealing for Gen Z, but in terms of lifetime earnings, a college degree is actually still incredibly important.

The big picture: There are plenty of reasons for the decline in perceived value among Americans.School is expensive, student loan debt is often onerous and job security for those with degrees has diminished— even more so with the advent of AI. Plus, at the moment new graduates are seeing higher unemployment rates.

There's also growing interest and appeal for young adults in the skilled trades — becoming plumbers, electricians, etc. — especially as AI appears to threaten white collar work.

Between the lines: There's also been loud criticism, particularly from conservatives, over the political leanings of universities, criticized as "elitist" "woke" "leftist," etc.Yet both Democrats and Republicans express far less support for higher education than they did more than a decade ago.

By the numbers: In 2013, 68% of Republicans said a college education was very important; this year that number fell to 20%, per Gallup.There's an even split between Republicans who say it's "not too important" (39%) and those who say it's "fairly important" (39%).Democrats went from 83% who said college was "very important" to 42%. Most, however, describe college as "fairly important."

Where it stands: College grads earn more than twice what high-school graduates make.The median income in a household headed by someone with at least a bachelor's degree was $132,700 last year — that's more than double the $58,410 median income of a household led by a high-school grad, according to Census income data released last week.

And earnings for college-led households have pulled away from the pack — rising more than 6% over the past two decades, compared with a 3% increase for high school graduates.

Polarization and Trust in News

Jacob Liedke and Elisa Shearer at Pew Research:

Labor 2025

Many posts have discussed labor unions.

Megan Brenan at Gallup:

As Americans prepare to celebrate Labor Day, 68% of U.S. adults approve of labor unions, essentially unchanged from last year’s reading. This is the fifth consecutive year that approval of organized labor has been in the 67% to 71% range, a level last reached in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

When Gallup first measured Americans’ ratings of labor unions in 1936, 72% approved. Approval reached the record high, 75%, in 1953 and 1957 and ranged between 63% and 73% from 1958 through 1967. Then, from 1972 through 2016, approval was lower, with few readings over 60%, including the 48% all-time low recorded in 2009. This was the only time approval fell below the majority level. Since 2017, approval has been above 60%, the longest period at this level since the 1960s.

The latest data, from Gallup’s Aug. 1-20 poll, show a continued wide divergence in partisans’ views of unions, as 90% of Democrats, 69% of independents and 41% of Republicans express approval. All party groups show increased support for unions compared with 2016, though Republican support has declined since peaking at 56% in 2022. That was the only time Republicans’ approval has risen above 50% in the past 25 years.