The Colorado Supreme Court ruled that, under section 3 of the 14th Amendment, Trump is ineligible to be on the Colorado presidential primary ballot.
Although we acknowledge that these definitions vary and some are
arguably broader than others, for purposes of deciding this case, we need not
adopt a single, all-encompassing definition of the word “insurrection.” Rather, it
suffices for us to conclude that any definition of “insurrection” for purposes ofSection Three would encompass a concerted and public use of force or threat of
force by a group of people to hinder or prevent the U.S. government from taking
the actions necessary to accomplish a peaceful transfer of power in this country.
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The required force or threat of force need not involve bloodshed, nor must the
dimensions of the effort be so substantial as to ensure probable success. In re
Charge to Grand Jury, 62 F. 828, 830 (N.D. Ill. 1894). Moreover, although those
involved must act in a concerted way, they need not be highly organized at the
insurrection’s inception. See Home Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Davila, 212 F.2d 731, 736 (1st
Cir. 1954) (“[A]t its inception an insurrection may be a pretty loosely organized
affair. . . . It may start as a sudden surprise attack upon the civil authorities of a
community with incidental destruction of property by fire or pillage, even before
the military forces of the constituted government have been alerted and mobilized
into action to suppress the insurrection.”).
¶185 The question thus becomes whether the evidence before the district court
sufficiently established that the events of January 6 constituted a concerted and
public use of force or threat of force by a group of people to hinder or prevent the
U.S. government from taking the actions necessary to accomplish the peaceful
transfer of power in this country. We have little difficulty concluding that
substantial evidence in the record supported each of these elements and that, as
the district court found, the events of January 6 constituted an insurrection.
¶186 It is undisputed that a large group of people forcibly entered the Capitol and
that this action was so formidable that the law enforcement officers onsite could
not control it. Moreover, contrary to President Trump’s assertion that no evidence
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in the record showed that the mob was armed with deadly weapons or that it
attacked law enforcement officers in a manner consistent with a violent
insurrection, the district court found—and millions of people saw on live
television, recordings of which were introduced into evidence in this case—thatthe mob was armed with a wide array of weapons. See Anderson, ¶ 155. The court
also found that many in the mob stole objects from the Capitol’s premises or from
law enforcement officers to use as weapons, including metal bars from the police
barricades and officers’ batons and riot shields and that throughout the day, the
mob repeatedly and violently assaulted police officers who were trying to defend
the Capitol. Id. at ¶¶ 156–57. The fact that actual and threatened force was usedthat day cannot reasonably be denied.
¶187 Substantial evidence in the record further established that this use of force
was concerted and public. As the district court found, with ample record support,
“The mob was coordinated and demonstrated a unity of purpose . . . . They
marched through the [Capitol] building chanting in a manner that made clear they
were seeking to inflict violence against members of Congress and Vice President
Pence.” Id. at ¶ 243. And upon breaching the Capitol, the mob immediately
pursued its intended target—the certification of the presidential election—and
reached the House and Senate chambers within minutes of entering the building.
Id. at ¶ 153.
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¶188 Finally, substantial evidence in the record showed that the mob’s unified
purpose was to hinder or prevent Congress from counting the electoral votes as
required by the Twelfth Amendment and from certifying the 2020 presidential
election; that is, to preclude Congress from taking the actions necessary to
accomplish a peaceful transfer of power. As noted above, soon after breaching the
Capitol, the mob reached the House and Senate chambers, where the certification
process was ongoing. Id. This breach caused both the House and the Senate to
adjourn, halting the electoral certification process. In addition, much of the mob’s
ire—which included threats of physical violence—was directed at Vice President
Pence, who, in his role as President of the Senate, was constitutionally tasked with
carrying out the electoral count. Id. at ¶¶ 163, 179–80; see U.S. Const. art. I, § 3,
cl. 4; id. at art. II, § 1, cl. 3. As discussed more fully below, these actions were the
product of President Trump’s conduct in singling out Vice President Pence for
refusing President Trump’s demand that the Vice President decline to carry out
his constitutional duties. Anderson, ¶¶ 148, 170, 172–73.
¶189 In short, the record amply established that the events of January 6
constituted a concerted and public use of force or threat of force by a group of
people to hinder or prevent the U.S. government from taking the actions necessary
to accomplish the peaceful transfer of power in this country. Under any viable
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definition, this constituted an insurrection, and thus we will proceed to consider
whether President Trump “engaged in” this insurrection.
